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Keith Edward MacMaster*
Retail investors are increasingly demanding responsible investments as part of
their portfolios. Retail investors also, generally, require the services of an advisor.
This article argues that traditional mutual funds, while structurally able to provide
responsible investments, have not provided responsible holdings to their mass
affluent retail investing clientele. While institutional investors, and certain very
wealthy retail investors, have a multitude of options to avail themselves of
responsible investments, mass affluent retail investors have less of an ability to
invest responsibly. Advisors and investors do not have access to the majority of
responsible investments, nor are advisors adequately trained or properly
compensated to provide advice on these products. Regulatory changes to advisor
licensing and training are recommended to address these problems to provide mass
affluent retail investors with better access to responsible investing options.
____________________________
Les particuliers exigent de plus en plus de leurs conseillers en investissement que
leurs portefeuilles soient composés de placements responsables. Selon l’auteur de cet
article, les fonds communs de placement classiques sont en mesure de répondre à
cette demande, mais ils ne le font pas même pour des clients particuliers aisés. Les
investisseurs institutionnels et les investisseurs particuliers très fortunés ont une
kyrielle d’options; cependant, les individus moins fortunés restent sur la touche : ils
n’ont pas accès à la majorité des placements responsables et leurs conseillers n’ont
ni la formation ni la rémunération appropriées pour faire des recommandations sur
les produits de cette nature. Il faudrait apporter des modifications d’ordre
réglementaire à la procédure d’octroi de permis aux conseillers ainsi qu’à leur
formation pour combler ces lacunes si on veut permettre aux clients particuliers
aisés d’avoir un meilleur accès aux placements responsables.
1. INTRODUCTION
The following story forms the basis of this article. I was sitting in my office
on an ordinary Thursday afternoon. The firm that I worked for, one of Canada’s
largest financial institutions, often gets ‘‘walk-in” clients. An elderly gentleman
walked into our branch, presented a large cheque, and told the customer service
representative (CSR) that he had just sold his house. The CSR asked if the client
would like to speak with an investment expert. The client agreed, and after the
normal introductions, financial reviews, and the ‘‘Know your Client” (KYC)
* Keith Edward MacMaster is a PhD candidate, Dalhousie University.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559871
procedures, I asked what his intentions were with the money. The client told me
that he wanted to invest it in ‘‘some sort of ethical or socially friendly way, I am
not sure on the right lingo.” I told him that our bank (all bank advisors are
mutual fund licensed, so by law I was only allowed to provide advice on mutual
funds, and only that bank’s mutual funds as all advisors can only sell proprietary
products) had such a fund. Fortunately, I knew what socially responsible
investing was, as most advisors do not. I printed off the Fund Facts, which is the
regulatory required document that describes the fund (described in more detail in
the retail disclosure section below) and discussed the fund with the client. The
house sale was approximately $400,000, so I did not need to refer him to our high
net worth group (minimums of $1 million are required). The client agreed, and
the transaction was completed. After the client left my office, I researched the
fund in more depth. I noticed some peculiarities and began to wonder if this fund
was truly socially responsible. I also researched on Morningstar the other funds
available at other institutions and noticed many similarities. This discovery led
me to asking myself, ‘‘Are clients with less than $1 million dollars actually getting
responsible investments? Do truely responsible investments of mutual funds
actually exist or are financial institutions peddling funds masquerading as
responsible?” I, like many advisors, was solely compensated via commissioned
sales, and so my income was funded by the transaction. However, I was paid less
on this fund than I would have been if I had pushed some of the bank’s other
funds. Thus, I also wondered if other advisors, even if they knew about
responsible investing, would have provided the advice knowing their
compensation cheque would be lower than if they suggested other funds. All
of these issues made me think that most Canadians do not have access to ethical,
environmental and socially responsible funds, and this is a big problem.
The above example is far too common for a financial advisor and forms the
basis for this article. The structure and regulation of licensing, standard of care,
compensation and education for retail advisors create barriers for the mass
affluent investor to access responsible investments (RIs). This article will answer
the question of whether legal, regulatory, and policy reform is required to
enhance the promotion of responsible investing vehicles and whether regulatory
licensing requirements must be updated to allow mutual fund licensed
representatives to sell a broader array of investment vehicles to ensure that
Mass Affluent investors have access to RI.
The ‘‘reasonable investor hypothesis” surmises that the best way to generate
returns is to understand long-term economic, social and environmental realities,
and relates to a desire to reduce risk.1 Most individuals in the developed world
are ‘‘middle income” earners and must personally save for retirement, known as
the ‘‘Mass Affluent” retail investor.2 Government sponsored and employer
1 Cary Krosinsky, Nick Robins, & Stephen Viederman, ‘‘After the Credit Crisis — The
Future of Sustainable Investing” in Next Generation of Responsible Investing, Tessa
Hebb (ed.) (Springer: 2012) at Ch. 2.
2 Rob Garver, ‘‘Banks Try, Try Again to Woo the Mass Affluent” (2010) 10 American
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pension plans are not designed to fully fund retirements, or help invest for other
purposes, so there is a real and substantial need for retail investments.3 Many
Mass Affluent investors want to make a substantial return on their investments,
all while doing so in an environmentally and socially responsible manner.4
Individuals, in large part, are unskilled at creating financial plans and require a
financial advisor to help them with their retirement and investing goals.5 As
retirement today can mean a timeframe of 25 years or longer, long-term returns
become vitally important, as the world will change in the upcoming decades.6
Simply put, without retail advisors, most individuals would not have the abilities
to invest.7
RI is investing in a responsible manner, while requiring profit maximization.8
There is ‘‘no authoritative definition,” of RI,9 however; accepted classifications
include negative and positive screens, Environmental, Social & Governance
(ESG) integration, sustainability themed investing, impact investing, and
corporate engagement/activist investing.10 Positive screens include companies
with positive influences, while negative screens eliminate undesirable companies
Banker 10 at 14; Strategy&,Wealthy,Young&Ambitious:Howbanks can profitably serve
the rising mass affluent (PwC/Strategy&, 2013).
3 Many self-employed do not have access to a government plan or to an employer pension
plan and must invest solely in retail products to fund their retirements; Government of
Canada, Canada Pension Plan (December 27, 2018), online: <https://www.canada.ca/
en/services/benefits/publicpensions/cpp.html>; the United States uses the social
security system, online: <https://www.ssa.gov/benefits/retirement/>.
4 Benjamin Richardson, Socially Responsible Investment Law: Regulating the Unseen
Polluters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
5 Kevin Dorey, ‘‘When do you need a financial advisor?”, Chronicle Herald (February 1,
2017);Meryl Landau, “DoYouNeed aFinancialAdviser?”,U.S.News&WorldReport
(September 1, 2011).
6 SunLife Financial Inc.,Retirement NowReport (Toronto: SunLife, 2016) at 7; Treasury
BoardCanada, ‘‘Sources ofRetirement Income” (December 30, 2016), online:<https://
www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/pension-plan/plan-informa-
tion/retirement-income-sources.html>; Emily Brandon, ‘‘The Top 10 Sources of
Retirement Income”, US News (May 13, 2014), online: <https://money.usnews.com/
money/blogs/planning-to-retire/2014/05/13/the-top-10-sources-of-retirement-in-
come>; Kenneth S. Shultz & MoWang, ‘‘Psychological Perspectives on the Changing
Nature of Retirement” (2011) 66:3 American Psychologist 170 at 172.
7 Ibid.
8 Benjamin Richardson &Wes Cragg, ‘‘Being Virtuous and Prosperous SRI’s conflicting
goals” Paper presented in the Principles of Responsible Investment Academic
Conference (Ottawa, ON: October 2009).
9 Benjamin Richardson, ‘‘Socially Responsible Investing for Sustainability: Overcoming
Its Incomplete and Conflicting Rationales” (2013) 2:2 Transnational Environmental
Law 311 at 313.
10 Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, 2016 Global Sustainable Investment Review,
online: <http://www.gsi-alliance.org/members-resources/trends-report-2016/> at 7
[GSIA].
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or industries.11 Impact investing is ‘‘targeted investments, typically made in
private markets, aimed at solving social or environmental problems.”12 RI is
moving away from command and control screens, favouring holistic integration
of ESG issues.13 This evolution is consistent with a ‘‘New Governance”
theoretical model that believes that firms that place an emphasis on ESG will
have less risk and better returns.14
This belief in lower risk for RI is important, as retail investors see risk only as
a downward drop in prices.15 Mass Affluent investors have a goal and timeframe
to invest.16 The psychological phenomenon of ‘‘loss aversion” relates to investors
being more concerned about losses than gains.17 For retail investors, risk is
fundamentally asymmetric.18
RI products, in general and over a long-time horizon, produce positive
returns. The ‘‘good management hypothesis” theorizes that the better the
governance of a firm, the better the results should be both financially and
reputationally.19 While there is still some debate in the literature, overall, it
appears that RI products outperform their non-RI counterparts.20 So, if RI
11 Thomas Berry & Joan Junkus, ‘‘Socially Responsible Investing: An Investor Perspec-
tive” (2013) 112 J Business Ethics 707 at 708; H. Boerner, ‘‘SRI: Passing Fad or an
Investment Approach on the Rise? Sustainable and Responsible Investment Outpaces
Most Traditional Indexes andEquityReturns duringDownturn” (2011) 16:1 Corp. Fin.
Rev 37 at 38; Jacquelyn Humphrey & Darren Lee, ‘‘Australian Socially Responsible
Funds: Performance, Risk and Screening Intensity” (2011) 102 J Business Ethics 519 at
520; Mark Rhodes, ‘‘Information Asymmetry and Socially Responsible Investment”
(2010) 95 J Business Ethics 145; Pieter Trinks & Bert Scholtens, ‘‘The Opportunity Cost
of Negative Screening in Socially Responsible Investing” (2017) 140 J Business Ethics
193.
12 GSIA, supra note 10 at 4.
13 Natalie Nowiski, ‘‘Rising above the Storm: Climate RiskDisclosure and its Current and
Future Relevance to the Energy Sector” (2018) 39:1 Energy LJ 1 at 8.
14 WA Bogart, Permit but Discourage: Regulating Excessive Consumption (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011) at 49-50; Mark DesJardine, Pratima Bansal, & Yang,
‘‘Bouncing Back: Building Resilience Through Social and Environmental Practices in
the Context of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis” (2017) 3 J Management 1.
15 Matthew Sherwood & Julia Pollard, ‘‘The risk-adjusted return potential of integrating
ESG strategies into emerging market equities” (2018) 8:1 J Sustainable Finance &
Investment 26 at 31.
16 Franklin Parker, ‘‘Quantifying downside risk in goal-based portfolios” (2014) 17:3 J
Wealth Management 68.
17 Ibid. at 69.
18 Frank Sortino, The Sortino Framework for Constructing Portfolios, (Elsevier, 2010);
VictoriaDobrynskaya,DownsideRisk in Stock andCurrencyMarkets, (September 2014)
PhD Dissertation, London School of Economics, [unpublished manuscript].
19 Benjamin Auer, & Frank Schumacher, ‘‘Do Socially (ir)Responsible investments pay?
Evidence from international ESGData” (2016) 59 Quarterly Review of Economics and
Finance 51 at 52.
20 Europe: Benjamin Auer, ‘‘Do Socially Responsible Investment Policies Add or Destroy
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products produce better returns than non-RI funds, and clients want to invest in
these products, why is there such little uptake? This article addresses this
question by showing that current research has failed to address the problems of
advisor licensing as an underlying root cause of RI uptake. The licensing of retail
advisors impacts RI in terms of both the legal structures utilized, the accessibility
of these structures to the Mass Affluent and the compensation offered to
advisors.21 The point of emphasis for this article is that certain products are
promoted more enthusiastically than others due to the larger sales commissions
embedded in these products.22
This article compares Canadian requirements against those in the United
States (US) and Australia as these nations have well-established stock markets
and a robust Mass Affluent population.23 This article will conclude that Canada
should adopt certain US and Australian licensing provisions to allow a broader
array of investments to be made available to the Mass Affluent, including
allowing retail advisors access to a broader range of RI products, along with
enhanced training and education requirements. This article will also argue that
securities laws focus on the type of structure, rather than its underlying
complexity, as a way to regulate products and may be partly to blame for the
dearth of RI investments available to the Mass Affluent. Construction of RI
investments that Mass Affluent investors can access is sorely needed.
Outside the scope of this article are environmentally related disclosure issues,
which are weak and are not uniform among jurisdictions.24 Stephen Kim Park
notes that investors must be able to analyze the outcomes of their investments.25
European Stock Portfolio Value?” (2016) 135 J Business Ethics 381; Tessa Hebb,
Canadian SRI Mutual Funds Risk / Return Characteristics (Carleton Centre for
Community Innovation: Carleton University, 2015) pub R15-02; Vanita Tripathi &
Varun Bhandari, ‘‘Do Ethical Funds underperform conventional Funds? Empirical
Evidence from India” (2015) 4:2 Int J Business Ethics inDevelopingEconomies;Gunnar
Friede, Timo Buschi and Alexander Bassen, ‘‘ESG and financial performance:
aggregated evidence from more than 2000 empirical studies” (2015) 5 J Sustainable
Finance & Investment 210; Kathrin Lesser, Felix Rößle & Christian Walkshäus,
‘‘Socially responsible, green, and faith-based investment strategies: Screening activity
matters!” (2016) 16FinanceResearchLetters 171;Michael Trudeau, ‘‘Non-ethical funds
outperform ethical rivals” (2011) Financial Advisor 1; Gerasimos Grompotis, ‘‘Eval-
uating aNewHotTrend:TheCaseofWaterExchange-TradedFunds” (2016) 6:4 J Index
Investing 103.
21 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘‘Methodology of Comparative Legal Research” (2015) Law and
Method 1 at 3; E. Morgera, ‘‘Global Environmental Law and Comparative Legal
Methods“ (2015) 24:3 Review of European, Comparative & Int Env L 254.
22 Rhys Bollen, ‘‘‘There is no Alpha’: Bounded Rationality in the Mutual Funds Market”
(2013) 28:2 Banking and Finance Law Review 225 at 227.
23 Jeff Desjardins, ‘‘Top 20 Stock Exchanges byMarket Capitalization”, Visual Capitalist
(April 10, 2017), online:<http://www.visualcapitalist.com/20-largest-stock-exchanges-
world/>.
24 Task Force on Climate Related Disclosures, Final Report — Recommendations of the
Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures (June 2017).
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Qualitative factors often lead to ESG issues being abandoned, and may preclude
an accurate ESG ‘‘score”,26 which makes evaluating companies/assets difficult,
but not impossible.27 Junkus & Berry noted that many performance studies have
data problems.28 There is a need to conduct further research on ranking schemes
and techniques.29 Also, outside scope, are the problems with the individual funds
themselves. Hawken concluded that many funds are masquerading as responsible
when they really adopt conventional investment approaches.30 Many RI funds
are ‘‘‘plain vanilla’ funds, holding the same companies as non-RI funds.”31 It is
doubtful that any broad-based plain vanilla RI fund could properly incorporate
all ESG factors. Future research should attempt to answer this question.
This article will proceed as follows: it will introduce basic fund structures
such as mutual funds, exchange traded funds, bonds and community economic
development investment funds; next, the article will compare Canadian
provisions against US and Australian counterparts for licensing, advisor
standard of care, suitability/know your client, retail document disclosure, fee
structures and education requirements; then the article will analyze licensing and
suitability against the fund structures; and, will conclude that most advisors do
not have access to most RI vehicles which limits the choice available to retail
investors and minimizes uptake of RI.
2. ADVISOR REGULATION
Investor licensing is directly related to which products are able to be sold to
the retail public. Many RI vehicles are implemented in forms inaccessible to the
Mass Affluent.32 As such, retail RI faces a headwind, not only from valuing the
25 Stephen Kim Park, ‘‘Social Bonds for Sustainable Development: A Human Rights
Perspective on Impact Investing” (2018) 0:0 Business and Human Rights J 1 at 5.
26 Diane-Laure Arjaliès & Pratima Bansal, ‘‘Beyond numbers: How investment managers
accommodate societal issues in financial decisions” (2018) 39:56 Organization Studies
691 at 710.
27 Sally Engle Merry, The Seductions of Quantification, Measuring Human Rights, Gender
Violence and Sex Trafficking (University of Chicago Press: Chicago Series in Law and
Policy, 2016) at 24.
28 Joan Junkus & Thomas Berry, ‘‘Socially responsible investing: a review of the critical
issues” (2015) 41:11 Managerial Finance 1176 at 1195.
29 Ibid. at 1196.
30 Paul Hawken, Socially Responsible Investing: How the SRI Industry has Failed to
Respond toPeoplewhoWant to Investwith aConscience andwhat can beDone toChange it
(California: National Capital Institute, 2004); Karen Benson, TJ Brailsford & JE
Humphrey, ‘‘Do socially responsible investment managers really invest differently?”
(2006) 64:4 J Business Ethics 337 at 352.
31 Guy Dixon, ‘‘Confused about Ethical Investing?”, Globe and Mail (April 15, 2017),
online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/confused-by-ethical-in-
vesting-heres-a-primer/article34332548/>; SIF, ‘‘Fast Facts”, online: <https://
www.ussif.org/fastfacts>.
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ESG scores of companies, but from its own distribution system: the financial
advisor network.33 Advisors need education, incentives, and the ability to sell RI
funds, but current licensing provisions prevent retail advisors from accessing,
recommending, or being knowledgeable about RI investments.34 Six concepts are
detailed in this article: licensing, advisor duties, suitability, document disclosure,
fee structures, and education. Bollen notes that ‘‘actively managed mutual funds
may be more promoted, and advisers may have an incentive to recommend
products that provide them with better remuneration.”35 Fee arrangements that
disincent advisors to provide certain choices for clients should be curtailed.
(a) Why Does this Matter — An Overview of Products
Over one-third of Canadians own mutual funds, accounting for 31% of
financial wealth.36 Approximately 43% of US households (55 million
households) own mutual funds.37 A mutual fund investor obtains instant
diversification and access to a broad array of underlying investments.38 Securities
laws serve to align investment decisions with the interests of fund members, so
the portfolio is structured to match investment objectives stated in its
Prospectus.39 Mutual funds can be rebalanced easily,40 and in registered
32 Outside scope is the Accredited Investor, which exempts certain investors from
disclosure obligations, Securities Act (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 73.3 [OSA],
Prospectus andRegistration Exemptions, OSCNI 45-106 41OSCB4574 at Part 2.3,Greg
Oguss, ‘‘Should Size orWealth Equal Sophistication inFederal Securities Laws?” (2012)
107:1NorthwesternUniversityLRev 285.GenerallyAccredited Investors have access to
IIROCdealers and as such have the full range of products available to them, based on an
arbitrary wealth threshold that has no relationship to knowledge or competency.
33 The systems are separated into the asset management network, those who build and
construct the funds, and the broker-dealer market, who distribute these funds to end
users.
34 EUHighLevel ExpertGroup on Sustainable Finance, Financing a Sustainable European
Economy, Final Report (European Commission, 2018) at 28.
35 Bollen, supra note 22 at 227.
36 IFIC, ‘‘Statistics and Facts”, online: <https://www.ific.ca/en/info/stats-and-facts/>.
37 ICI, Review of Trends and Activities in the Investment Company Industry (2017
Investment Company Fact Book, ICI, 2017); Sarah Holden, ICI Study: 55 Million US
Households Own Mutual Funds (ICI, 2017).
38 Investment Funds, OSC NI 81-102 (2017) 41 OSCB 9993 [NI 81-102]; Mutual Fund
Prospectus Disclosure Rule, OSC NI 81-101 (2017), 40 OSCB 1584 [NI 81-101];
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64; LL Gremillion, Mutual
fund industry handbook: a comprehensive guide for investment professionals (Hoboken,
N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005); John Haslam,Mutual Funds Portfolio Structures,
Analysis,Management, and Stewardship (Hoboken,N.J.:Wiley, 2010);WilliamBertin&
Laurie Prather, ‘‘Management structure and the performance of funds of mutual funds”
(2009) 62 J Business Research 1364 at 1367.
39 OSA, supra note 32, s. 116(a); Investment Fund Continuous Disclosure, OSC NI 81-106,
(2018) 41 OSCB [NI 81-106].
40 Kent Thune, ‘‘How and When to Rebalance your Portfolio”, Balance (April 5, 2018),
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accounts can be rebalanced without tax consequences.41 Downside issues include
substantial restrictions on the underlying investments — done to ‘‘protect” the
retail investor42 — high fees,43 and explicit and ‘‘closet” indexing.44 Alpha is the
measure of active return on an investment.45 Actively managed funds have larger
fees than passive funds, lowering returns, and 66-75% of US active managers
underperform the market, while in Canada, the percentage soars to 91%.46 Many
RI funds use active management including diversification strategies, proxy
voting, and ESG integration.47 This management puts RI funds at a
disadvantage as exchange traded funds are generally less expensive.
An exchange traded fund (ETF) is a marketable security that tracks an index,
commodity, bond, or basket of assets.48 ETFs trade like stocks on an exchange,
with higher liquidity, a wider range of investing strategies, and lower fees than
mutual funds, making them attractive to investors.49 ETFs can short stocks, lend
shares, use leverage and use more complex derivative strategies that mutual funds
online: <https://www.thebalance.com/how-and-when-to-rebalance-your-portfolio-
2466529>.
41 Government of Canada, ‘‘Registered Retirement Savings Plan” (December 14, 2018),
online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/individuals/topics/
rrsps-related-plans.html>; Shaun Pfeiffer, ‘‘Tax Efficiency of Mutual Funds and
Exchange-Traded Funds” (2016) J Financial Services Professionals 19.
42 NI 81-102, supra note 38, Part 2.3.
43 John Adams, et al., ‘‘Are mutual fund fees excessive?” (2012) 36 J Banking & Finance
2245at 2258; James Cox & John Payne, ‘‘Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A
Behavioral Perspective” (2005) 83 Wash University L Quar 907.
44 MartijnCremers, et al., ‘‘Indexing and active fundmanagement: International evidence”
(2016) 120 J Financial Economics 539.
45 RobRussell, ‘‘ABCs of Investing, Alpha, Beta andCorrelation”, Forbes (July 14, 2014),
online: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/robrussell/2014/07/15/abcs-of-investing-for-
experienced-investors/#13077bc7393f>.
46 Aye Soe & Ryan Poirier, SPIVA1 Canada Scorecard (S&P Global, 2016); Jeff Cox,
‘‘Bad times for active managers: Almost none have beaten the market over the past 15
years”, CNBCNews (April 12, 2017), online:<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/12/bad-
times-for-active-managers-almost-none-have-beaten-the-market-over-the-past-15-
years.html>; Owen Walker, ‘‘Active fund managers beat market by just 16p for every
»100 invested”, Press Release (January 28, 2018) via ProQuest database.
47 Indrani De, & Michelle Clayman, ‘‘The benefits of socially responsible investing: An
active manager’s
perspective” (2015) 24:4 J Investing 49 at 50.
48 Martin Lettau & Ananth Madhaven, ‘‘Exchange-Traded Funds 101 for Economists”
(2018) 32:1 J Economic Perspectives 135.
49 Azhar Mohamad, Aziz Jaafar & John Goddard ‘‘Short selling and exchange-traded
funds returns: evidence from the London Stock Exchange” (2016) 48:2 Applied
Economics 152; JamesChong,MonicaHussein,&Michael Phillips, ‘‘S&P500ETFs and
Index Funds: Are Fees All There Is to It” (2011) 14:2 J Wealth Management at 59;
Joanne Hill, ‘‘The Evolution and Success of Index Strategies in ETFs” (2016) 72:5
Financial Analysts J 8; Gary Gastineau, The Exchange-Traded Funds Manual, 2nd ed.
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cannot.50 US investors in ETFs have tax advantages and can defer capital gains
tax until the entire ETF is sold, whereas with mutual funds, investors must claim
capital gains tax every time assets in the fund are sold.51 ETFs have played a
major role in passive investing.52 ETFs evolved from complex structures like
bull/bear structures and are thus believed (wrongly) that they are more complex
(but not necessarily riskier) than mutual funds, even if most ETFs created today
are simple index structures.53 It is this wide range of strategies and low cost which
may make ETFs better suited for RI.
Retail investors use bonds as part of the fixed income component of their
portfolio.54 Green bonds pass certification processes to ensure that the projects
funded have environmental/social benefits.55 Legally speaking, there is nothing
unique about a green bond, with most being ‘‘asset-linked” instruments.56
Carney notes ‘‘. . . the transition . . . provides an annual opportunity worth
trillions of dollars for companies and financiers.”57 Green and other RI bonds
are a potentially valuable source for RI investments.
Community Economic Development Investment Funds (CEDIF)58 allow for
raising capital to invest in not-for-profit entities within a defined community.59
(Hoboken,NJ: JohnWiley&Sons. 2010); AnnaAgapova, ‘‘ConventionalMutual index
funds versus Exchange Traded Funds” (2011) 14 J Financial Markets 323 at 324.
50 Mohamad, Jaafar & Goddard, ibid.; see also Joseph Engleberg, et al., ‘‘Short-selling
Risk” (2018) LXXIII:2 J Finance 755; Christopher Nicholls, Corporate Finance and
Canadian Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) ch.5.
51 Mark Kennedy, ‘‘ETF Tax Advantages over Mutual Funds”, Balance (June 16, 2018),
online: <https://www.thebalance.com/etf-tax-advantages-over-mutual-funds-
1215121>; Fidelity Investments LLC, ‘‘Benefits of ETFs”, online: <https://www.fi-
delity.com/learning-center/investment-products/etf/benefits-of-etfs>.
52 Cremers et al, supra note 44 at 540; Ananth Madhaven, Exchange Traded Funds and the
NewDynamics of Investing (OxfordScholarshipOnline, 2016)CaitlinDannhauser, ‘‘The
impact of innovation: Evidence from corporate bond exchange-traded funds” (2017) 125
J Financial Economics 537.
53 Hill, Evolution of ETFs, supra note 49.
54 Vasile Dedu & Dan NitÇescu, ‘‘Use of fixed income products within a company’s
portfolio” (2012) 10:10 Theoretical and Applied Economics 5 at 7; SIFMA, 2017 Fact
Book (New York: SIFMA Research Department, 2017) at 4.
55 Amelie Labbe, ‘‘PRIMER: green bonds” (2017) Int Fin L Rev London 1; International
Capital Markets Association, ‘‘Social Bonds Principles” (June 2018), online: <https://
www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Green-Bonds/SocialBondsBro-
chure-JUNE2017.pdf>.
56 Michael Flaherty et al., ‘‘Financing climate policies through climate bonds — A three
stagemodel and empirics” (2017) 42Research in International Business andFinance 468
at 471-472; ThiamNg& Jacqueline Tao, ‘‘Bond financing for renewable energy in Asia”
(2016) 95 Energy Policy 509 at 514.
57 CTV, ‘‘Companies need to come clean about climate change risk, Mark Carney says”,
CTVNews (July 15, 2016), online: <http://www.ctvnews.ca/business/companies-need-
to-come-clean-about-climate-change-risk-mark-carney-says-1.2987976>.
58 Community Economic-Development Corporations Regulations, NS Reg 79/98, Sch A
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Social enterprises often emerge in geographies where the market and state have
failed to provide adequate responses to social, economic, and environmental
challenges.60 Local communities are unlikely to have many locally-based
investors who are sophisticated and locally focused, and those who are
sophisticated are likely using networks to look outside the area for investment
opportunities.61 A CEDIF is small by nature.62 Advantages include investing
locally in a small business and favourable tax treatment.63 Wind4all
Communities III Inc. is an example of a CEDIF with a Mi’kmaq partner
highlighting positive Indigenous rights/economic development opportunities.64
One of these Mi’kmaq partners, the Pictou Landing First Nation,65 is a
historically disadvantaged community that has suffered human rights abuses.66
Thus, mutual funds, ETFs, bonds and CEDIFs are all potential RI
structures. Unfortunately, licensing provisions, as illustrated in the next
section, prevent most Mass Affluent retail investors from accessing these
vehicles. Also, of significant note, the issues detailed in this section regarding RI
are the same issues that regulators are reviewing for the industry as a whole.67
(i) Licensing
Securities in Canada, including advisor licensing, are regulated provincially,
and are designed to protect ‘‘investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent
practices; and to foster fair and efficient capital markets.”68 The securities
[CEDIF Regs]; Michael Friedman, Budget 2016: Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital
Corporations Tax Credit Re-Introduced (Toronto: McMillan LLP, 2016).
59 NSSC, ‘‘Community Economic-Development Investment Funds (CEDIFs)”, online:
<https://nssc.novascotia.ca/corporate-finance/community-economic-development-
Investment-funds>; NSSC, CEDIF, NSSC Policy 45-601 (January 17, 2014), Blanket
Order No. 45-521.
60 Douglas Lionais, ‘‘Social Enterprise in Atlantic Canada Canadian” (2015) 6:1 J
Nonprofit Social Economy Research 25.
61 Harvey Johnstone, ‘‘Business model innovation: a case study of venture capital in a
depleted community” (2013) 15:1 Venture Capital 77.
62 CEDIF Regs, supra note 58, ss. 10-12, 17.
63 Equity Tax Credit Act, S.N.S. 1993, c. 3, s. 11; Equity Tax Credit Regulations, N.S. Reg.
18/94; Government of Nova Scotia, Equity Tax Credit, Equity Tax Credit Application
(January 22, 2019), online: <https://www.novascotia.ca/finance/en/home/taxation/
tax101/personalincometax/equitytaxcredit/default.aspx>.
64 Assante Wealth Management Hydrostone, ‘‘Wind4all Communities III Inc.”, online:
<http://www.assantehydrostone.com/wind4all/>, s. 28.
65 Ibid. at 41.
66 Joan Baxter, The Mill: Fifty Years of Pulp and Protest (Pottersfield Press, 2017).
67 StatusReport onCSAConsultation Paper 33-404 Proposals to Enhance theObligations
of Advisers, Dealers, and Representatives Toward Their Clients, CSA Staff Notice 33-
319 (June 1, 2017).
68 Christopher Nicolls, Securities Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2018), OSA, supra
note 32, ss. 1.1, 143(13); Securities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 418 [NSSA] ss. 1A(a), 1.2; CSA,
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commissions delegate to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) retail advisor
licensing and educational requirements, with two primary categories of
registration; investment dealers and mutual fund dealers.69 The two main
SROs are the Mutual Fund Dealers Association (MFDA)70 and the Investment
Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC).71 The representatives of
each category are limited in terms of the products about which they can provide
advice. An investment dealer may act as a dealer in respect of any security;
whereas a mutual fund dealer may only act as a dealer in respect of any mutual
fund.72 Mutual funds are regulated by the MFDA and most bank financial
advisors are mutual fund licensed.73 Mutual fund advisors cannot provide advice
on stocks, bonds, ETFs and non-mutual fund-based index funds. There are
currently approximately 79,800 licensed mutual fund advisors in Canada, which
makes funds the most widely available type of structure available.74
Investment advisors are regulated by IIROC.75 There are fewer IIROC
advisors as compared to MFDA advisors currently licensed.76 There are
approximately only 8,200 licensed advisors of the big Canadian banks and
large independent firms.77 IIROC advisors also have higher minimum
thresholds, with some firms maintaining a ‘‘posted” $250,000 investment
minimum; however, in personally speaking with several brokers, the actual
minimum is closer to $500,000,78 with seasoned IIROC advisors having
minimums of $1 million.79 These minimums stem from fee structures, as most
‘‘A Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Securities
Regulation” (2004), online: <https://www.securities-administrators.ca/aboutcsa.asp-
x?id=77>.
69 Registration Requirements, Exemptions, and Ongoing Registrant Obligations, OSC NI
31-103 (December 4, 2017) para. 7.1(1) [NI 31-103]; OSA, supra note 32, s. 21.1; Gary
Gassman&PerryGranof, ‘‘Global IssuesAffectingSecuritiesClaimsat theBeginningof
the Twenty-First Century” (2007) 43 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 85 at 88.
70 Ibid. at para. 9.2.
71 Ibid. at para. 9.1.
72 Ibid. at para. 7.2.
73 MFDA, ‘‘Membership statistics”, online: <http://mfda.ca/members/membership-
statistics/>.
74 Ibid.
75 IIROC, ‘‘About IIROC, Know Your Advisor”, online: <http://www.iiroc.ca/about/
Pages/default.aspx>.
76 Ibid.
77 Staff Report, ‘‘The Firms with the Biggest Books, the Most Assets and the Largest
Rosters” Advisor Magazine (May 4, 2016), online: <http://www.advisor.ca/news/
industry-news/the-firms-with-the-biggest-books-the-most-assets-and-the-largest-ros-
ters-205346>.
78 For example, Schultz Group has a minimum threshold of $500,000. Scotia Wealth
Management, ‘‘The Schultz Group”, online: <http://www.schultzgroup.ca/Services/
Fee-Based-Investing.html>.
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IIROC brokers are compensated via sales commissions and trailer revenue. Only
investors with at significant investable assets can access an IIROC broker.80
Most Mass Affluent investors will not meet these minimum thresholds, they will
not be able to access an IIROC broker and will be limited to accessing only
mutual fund products. Thus, if a retail investor wishes to purchase an RI ETF or
individual bond, they must either use an IIROC broker or use an online
brokerage and trade themselves.81
In the US, the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and state securities commissions
govern adviser licensing.82 Canadian and US licensing are similar in that both
separate the two roles of investment adviser and, in the US case, a limited service
adviser.83 FINRA is authorized by SEC to protect investors and ensure the fair
and honest operation of markets.84 It does not regulate funds but regulates the
broker-dealers and approximately 629,525 registered securities representatives
that sell funds.85 There was movement by Congress to separate the regulatory
environment for mutual funds and investment advisers, similar to the Canadian
experience; however, this has not yet occurred.86
The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) regulates the
fund industry in Australia.87 Australia has moved to a centralized federal
government securities regulatory regime, like the US to oversee its 25,379
advisors.88 Australia and Canada are similar in that retail investors are more
79 Mathieu Storrier, Scotia McLeod, online: <http://crescoadvisorygroup.ca/second-
opinion/>;DavidAston, ‘‘APerfectFit”,MoneySense (May12, 2011), online:<http://
www.moneysense.ca/magazine-archive/a-perfect-fit/>.
80 Edwin Weinstein, Mutual Fund Fee Research, Paper submitted to CSA per RFP OSC
201314M -93 (OSC/Brondesbury Group, 2015) at 49 [Weinstein].
81 Online brokers are for the do-it yourself investor. These channels do not provide any
advice or guidance on product suitability, nor require a duty of care. If the client requires
advice, the only channel for ETFs or stocks is the broker/IIROC channel.
82 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 through 15 U.S.C. § 80b-21, s. 203A.
ø80b—3a & SEC. 222 ø80b—18a [IAA].
83 Ibid.
84 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 94-29, sec. 3(6), § 3(a)(26), 89 Stat. 97, 100
(1975) (codified as amended at 15U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2012)), 15U.S.C. § 78o-3. Barbara
Black, ‘‘PunishingBadBrokers: Self-Regulation andFINRASanctions” (2013) 8Brook
J. Corp. Fin & Com. L. 23.
85 FINRA, ‘‘About Us”, online: <http://www.finra.org/about>; Exchange Act Release
No. 55495, 2007 WL 1260858 (March 20, 2007) at 9; FINRA, ‘‘Statistics”, online:
<https://www.finra.org/newsroom/statistics>.
86 Barbara Black, ‘‘Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?” (2008) 2 Brook J. Corp. Fin &
Com. L 303 at 319-20.
87 Australia,Corporations Act of 2001 (Cth)No. 50, 2001, Part 7.6 [AustraliaCorporations
Act].
88 Pamela Hanrahan & Ian Ramsay, ‘‘Regulation of mutual funds in Australia”, to be
published inResearchHandbook onMutual Funds,WilliamBirdthistle and JohnMorley
398 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [34 B.F.L.R.]
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559871
likely to retain the services of a financial advisor/financial planner rather than an
investment advisor, which means that funds will be the more prominent products
being sold.89 The responsible entities that operate as advisors must be licensed
under the Australian Financial Services (AFS) licensing regime.90 The Australian
Corporations Act provides that ‘‘a financial services licensee may give the
authorized representative a written notice authorizing the person, for the
purposes of this Chapter, to provide a specified financial service or financial
services on behalf of the licensee.”91 The financial services specified may be some
or all of the financial services covered by the licensee’s licence.92 Thus, not all
licensed individuals will deal in both securities and mutual funds.
All three countries separate mutual fund advisors from the broader securities
brokers. The treatment of mutual funds as distinct from other securities creates a
potential for systemic bias and suggests a need for a more extensive regulatory
review. This separation would affect Australians in much the same manner as
Canadians.
(ii) Advisor duties
Investor protection depends on the unique relationship between financial
advisor and client. Canadian advisors owe a duty to act fairly, honestly and in
good faith with their clients.93 This obligation, unfortunately, does not amount
to a fiduciary duty or even a best interest standard.94 A fiduciary duty requires
fiduciaries to make complete disclosure of all material information.95 There are
(eds) (EdwardElgarPublishing, 2017); see alsoASIC,AnnualReport 2016-2017 (Sydney:
ASIC, 2017).
89 Ibid. at 8.
90 Ibid. at 12.
91 Australia Corporations Act, supra note 87, s. 916A.
92 Ibid., s. 921B (2)-(4).
93 OSA, supra note 32, ss. 25(1), 36(1), NSSA, supra note 68, s. 39A; Securities Act
(Alberta), R.S.A. 2000, C. S-4, s. 75.2.
94 Hunt v. TDSecurities Inc., 2003CarswellOnt 3141, 66O.R. (3d) 481, 36B.L.R. (3d) 165,
39 C.P.C. (5th) 206, 229 D.L.R. (4th) 609, 175 O.A.C. 19, [2003] O.J. No. 3245 (Ont.
C.A.); additional reasons 2003 CarswellOnt 4971, 40 B.L.R. (3d) 156, 43 C.P.C. (5th)
211, [2003] O.J. No. 4868 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused 2004 CarswellOnt 1610,
2004CarswellOnt 1611, 330N.R. 198 (note), 196O.A.C. 399 (note), [2003] S.C.C.A.No.
473 (S.C.C.); Varcoe v. Sterling, 1992 CarswellOnt 888, 7 O.R. (3d) 204, [1992] O.J. No.
60 (Ont. Gen. Div.); affirmed 1992 CarswellOnt 976, 10 O.R. (3d) 574, [1992] O.J. No.
1501 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused (1992), [1992] 3 S.C.R. viii (note), 10 O.R. (3d)
xv, 145N.R. 390 (note), 60O.A.C. 74 (note), [1992] S.C.C.A.No. 440 (S.C.C.); however,
see Andrews v. Keybase Financial Group Inc., 2014 NSSC 287, 2014 CarswellNS 582,
349 N.S.R. (2d) 1, 1101 A.P.R. 1, [2014] N.S.J. No. 418 (N.S. S.C.), and Industrial
Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc. v. Brine, 2015 NSCA 104, 2015
CarswellNS 913, 367 N.S.R. (2d) 108, 54 C.C.L.I. (5th) 1, 392 D.L.R. (4th) 575, 1157
A.P.R. 108, 2015 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8157 (headnote only), [2016] I.L.R. I-5827, [2015]
N.S.J. No. 486 (N.S. C.A.); additional reasons 2016NSCA 3, 2016 CarswellNS 45 (N.S.
C.A.); leave to appeal refused 2016 CarswellNS 399, 2016 CarswellNS 400 (S.C.C.).
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limited circumstances where advisors can hold ‘‘discretionary” investment
accounts, which allow the advisor to make decisions and trades without the
clients express consent, and there is full trust and confidence and discretion, then
there may be fiduciary duties attached to the advisor.96 However, this is the
exception, not the norm, as most advisors are ‘‘order-takers” and the Supreme
Court of Canada has ruled that fiduciary duties do not attach to order takers,
who offer little to no advice.97
The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) has been investigating the
need to enhance the obligations of advisors, dealers, and representatives toward
a best interest standard for their clients.98 Through the Fund Facts delivery
(Point of Sale)99 and Client Relationship Model Phase 2 (CRM2)100 initiatives,
the CSA has introduced regulatory reforms to make mutual fund fees,
registrants’ compensation, and clients’ investment performance more
transparent.101 Adding a best interest standard and ‘‘leveling the playing field”
by equalizing compensation structures would be a positive step to all mutual
funds, with RI being an unintended beneficiary. The CSA has identified five
issues that could be solved by a best interest standard, including rates of returns
95 Leonard Rotman, ‘‘Understanding Fiduciary Duties and Relationship Fiduciarity”
(2017) 62:4 McGill L J 1 at 10, 16.
96 Kent v. May, 2001 CarswellAlta 721, 298 A.R. 71, [2001] A.J. No. 552 (Alta. Q.B.) at
paras. 51-53; affirmed 2002 ABCA 252, 2002 CarswellAlta 1311, 317 A.R. 381, 284
W.A.C. 381, [2002] A.J. No. 1327 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 55; additional reasons 2002
ABCA 306, 2002 CarswellAlta 1626, [2002] A.J. No. 1554 (Alta. C.A.) [Kent v. May];
Varcoe v. Sterling, supra note 94 at paras. 234-236, EricDolden&TomNewnham,Legal
Liability for Financial Advisors in Canada (Vancouver: Dolden, Wallace, Folick LLP,
2015) at 19 [Dolden & Newnham].
97 Hodgkinson v. Simms, 1994 CarswellBC 438, 1994 CarswellBC 1245, EYB 1994-67089,
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, 97 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 16 B.L.R. (2d) 1, 22 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, 57 C.P.R.
(3d) 1, 117 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 5 E.T.R. (2d) 1, [1994] 9 W.W.R. 609, 49 B.C.A.C. 1, 6
C.C.L.S. 1, 95 D.T.C. 5135, 171 N.R. 245, 80W.A.C. 1, [1994] S.C.J. No. 84 (S.C.C.) at
para. 33 [Hodgkinson v. Simms], Leonard Rotman, ‘‘Fiduciary Law’s Holy Grail:
Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence” (2011) 91:921 Boston
University L Rev 921 at 965-966.
98 OSC, Consultation Paper OSC 33-404 (April 28, 2016), online: <http://www.osc.go-
v.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20160428_33-404_proposals-enhance-obligations-advi-
sers-dealers-representatives.htm>.
99 Implementation of the Final Stage of Point of Sale Disclosure forMutual Funds: Pre-Sale
Delivery of Fund Facts, CSA Notice of Amendments to NI 81-101 Mutual Fund
Prospectus Disclosure and to Companion Policy 81-101CP Mutual Fund Prospectus
Disclosure (2014) 37 OSCB 10985.
100 CSA Notice of Amendments to National Instrument 31-103 Registration Requirements,
Exemptions and Ongoing Registrant Obligations and to Companion Policy 31-103CP
Registration Requirements, Exemptions and Ongoing Registrant Obligations (Cost
Disclosure, Performance Reporting and Client Statements) (2013) 36 OSCB 3173.
101 RudyLuukko, ‘‘The days are numbered for embedded fund commissions”,Morningstar
(June 29, 2016), online: <http://cawidgets.morningstar.ca/ArticleTemplate/Article-
GL.aspx?id=758402&culture=en-CA>.
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and fees (i.e. value for money), misplaced trust, conflicts of interest, information
asymmetry, and outcomes based on the regulatory regime.102 Moving to a best
interest standard would alleviate (at least in theory) some of these issues as
advisors would need better skill sets to meet their duties.
The duty of care, on the other hand, differs in the US from Canada. Under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA), it is unlawful for any investment
advisor to directly or indirectly defraud, deceive, or engage in a deceptive or
manipulative practice.103 It is also illegal for any person willfully to make any
untrue statement of a material fact in any registration application or willfully to
omit to state in any such application or report any material fact which is required
to be stated therein.104 In the US, the above legislation has been interpreted to be
a fiduciary duty standard, and would pose greater obligations on the advisor
than their Canadian counterparts.105
Like the CSA, the SEC is mandating increased reforms and disclosures for
advisors.106 This reform is characterized as the ‘‘fiduciary duty” versus suitability
standard of care.107 As fiduciaries, investment advisors owe their clients a duty to
provide only suitable advice, which takes into account the client’s financial
situation, investment experience, and investment objectives.108 The disclosures or
lack thereof, and the lack of training around RI may not amount to a breach of
fiduciary duty, but it could impact a client’s purchasing decision, especially if a
best interest standard was imposed.109 Presumably, this fiduciary duty standard
should lead to increased and more complete disclosures of RI materials in US
than in Canada. Unfortunately, the legislation seems doomed for repeal.110
The United Kingdom, European Union, and Australia already mandate a
best interest standard.111 Dealer and advisors in Australia have a fiduciary duty
102 Ibid. at para. i.
103 IAA, supra note 82, ss. 206, 207, SEC. 206 ø80b—6.
104 Ibid., s. 207. ø80b—7.
105 Securities & Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 11 L.Ed.2d
237, 84 S.Ct. 275, 375 U.S. 180 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1963).
106 SEC, Commission Guidance on Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 33-9106,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-61469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6289 (February 2, 2010).
107 James Wrona, ‘‘The Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-Based Analysis of the Legal
Obligations of InvestmentAdvisers andBroker-Dealers and aFramework forEnhanced
Investor Protection” (2012) 68:1 Business Lawyer 1.
108 SEC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1406 (March 16, 1994).
109 Joseph Goertz, Swarn Chatterjee & Brenda Cude, ‘‘Suitability vs Fiduciary Standard:
The perceived impacts of changing one’s standard of care” (2014) 27:2 J Financial
Planning 20.
110 Financial Choice Act (US), H.R.10 — 115th Congress (2017-2018) [FCA].
111 AustraliaCorporations Act, supra note 87, Part 7.7A, Division 2, Subdivision B, s. 961B;
Standard of Conduct for Advisers and Dealers: Exploring the Appropriateness of
Introducing aStatutoryBest InterestDutyWhenAdvice is Provided toRetailClients, OSC
CSA Consultation Paper 33-403 (2012) 35 OSCB 9558 at 3.
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to their clients. A duty of care, diligence and honesty includes a ‘‘best interests”
standard,112 which is more akin to US standards and is more onerous than
Canadian requirements. The Australian Statement of Advice113 contains even
more information and requires a more thorough review of client circumstances
than Canada requires, which should uncover more environmental and ethical
preferences than Canadian advisors can under current suitablility requirements.
(iii) Suitability/Know Your Client
Despite the differences in advisor standards of care, all three jurisdictions use
the KYC rule as one of the most important rules an advisor must follow.114 KYC
obligations mandate that advisors select investments that are suitable for their
client’s investment needs, time horizons, purpose of investment, and risk
tolerances.115 Breaches of KYC and suitability, while not amounting to a breach
of fiduciary duties, do amount to breach of contract and potentially
negligence.116 In Canada, and the US, there are currently no KYC
requirements for an advisor to ask about a client’s preference, inclination or
desire for RI. This lack of such a requirement is a problem as RI, on one hand,
may pose diversification risks due to screens limiting assets available for
investment, while on the other hand, RI may limit downsize risk on a client’s
portfolio.117 Obligations of advisers must be enhanced by adding ESG factors to
the KYC.118
In the US, FINRA Rule 2111 states that a
member or an associated person must have a reasonable basis to believe that a
recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or
securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information obtained
through the reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to
ascertain the customer’s investment profile.119
Suitability should encompass a client’s willingness, desire, aptitude and appetite
for RI investments.120 There are forces that may dissuade an advisor from
112 FCA, supra note 110, s. 601FC(1).
113 Australia Corporations Act, supra note 87, Part 7.7, Division 3, Subdivision C, s. 946A.
114 NI 31-103, supra note 69, s 13.2. Kent v. May, supra note 96 at para. 65, Dolden &
Newnham, supra note 96 at 22-25.
115 Suitability Obligation andKnowYour Product, CSA Staff Notice 33-315 (2009) 32OSCB
6890.
116 Kent v. May, supra note 96 at 65.
117 Ick Jin, ‘‘Is ESG a systemic risk factor for US equity mutual funds” (2018) 8:1 J
Sustainable Finance and Investment 72 at 73, 75.
118 RIA, Comments Regarding CSA Consultation Paper 33-404: Proposals to Enhance the
Obligations of Advisers, Dealers, and Representatives toward their Clients (September 26,
2016).
119 FINRA, Suitability Rule 2111; Know your Customer, FINRA Rule 2090, R-FINRA-
2010-039 and amended by SR-FINRA-2011-016 eff. (July 9, 2012).
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discussing these investment vehicles, including fee structures, advertising, and
educational requirements, the same forces that affect advice in Canada.
The Australian best interest standard ensures that advisors recommend
financial products that are suitable, having regard to each client’s objectives,
financial situation, and needs.121 However, unlike Canada and the US, there is
specific guidance for environmental, social and ethical considerations. Australian
guidance states that
Advice providers must form their own view about how far s961B requires
inquiries to be made into the client’s attitude to environmental, social or ethical
considerations. Advice providers may need to ascertain whether environmen-
tal, social or ethical considerations are important to the client and, if they are,
conduct inquiries about them.122
(iv) Retail document disclosure
Clients cannot make informed, meaningful investment choices unless they
obtain all necessary information. Advertising issues complement the problems
with disclosures, as advertising includes all sales material provided to the
investor.123 The Fund Facts must be provided to clients for any sales of mutual
funds.124 The Fund Facts contains a description of the purpose of the fund and
the appropriate investor, which will indicate whether the fund is intended to be
an RI fund.125 It describes relevant fund elements, including historical rates of
return, fees, top holdings, investment mix, and risk rating. The ‘‘marketing
pitch” from this document needs to be credible in that it should better illustrate
how and why the underlying companies and assets are included. This shows the
interlink between lack of material disclosures and the need for enhanced KYC
and regulatory documents provided to retail investors. This applies to all
advisors, regardless of the licensing body.
120 FINRA, ‘‘Suitability: What Investors Need to Know”, online: <http://www.finra.org/
investors/suitability-what-investors-need-know>.
121 Australia Corporations Act, supra note 87, Part 7.7, s. 961B; see also ASIC, RG 175,
(November 2017), ss. RG. 175.254, RG 175.309.
122 Ibid. at RG 175.311.
123 OSA, supra note 32, s. 50(2).
124 Mutual Fund Prospectus Disclosure, supra note 38, Point of Sale for mutual funds and
segregated funds, OSCFramework 81-406, (2008) 31OSCB10479; Implementation of the
Final Stage of Point of Sale Disclosure forMutual Funds: Pre-Sale Delivery of Fund Facts
— CSA Notice of Amendments to NI 81-101 Mutual Fund Prospectus Disclosure and to
Companion Policy 81-101CPMutual Fund Prospectus Disclosure (2014) 37 OSCB 10985
[OSC 81-406]; ETF Facts: Filing and Delivery Requirements for a Summary Disclosure
Document for Exchange-Traded Mutual Funds, OSC Framework (2016) 39 OSCB 9948;
CSA Notice of Amendments to National Instrument 41-101 General Prospectus
Requirements Form 41-101F4 Information Required in an ETF Facts Document (Form
41-101F4) (2017) 40 OSCB 1585
125 Ibid.
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Advertising regulations in the US is another potential issue of RI
misrepresentation. FINRA Rule 2210 governs US rules around advertising
and client communications.126 RI is manifestly misunderstood in general, so it is
not improbable that advisor communications may not reflect the true nature,
intent and performance of RI. More importantly is the lack of communication
and advertising for RI. A dearth of communication may be seen as indifference,
or apathy towards RI. Lipton notes, ‘‘sharing sustainability information,
corporate responsibility initiatives and progress publicly on the company’s
website and bringing them to these investors’ attention are significant actions in
the new paradigm.”127
Continuous disclosure obligations in Australia are conducted via a Product
Disclosure Statement, much like the Fund Facts in Canada.128 The regulations
contain ‘‘Good Disclosure Principles” which require timely, relevant and
complete disclosure that promotes product understanding and facilitates
product comparison all with regard to consumers’ needs.129 Content
requirements include ‘‘fees payable in respect of a financial product; risks of a
financial product; benefits of a financial product; and significant characteristics
of a financial product.”130
(v) Fee structures
NI 81-105 provides for permitted compensation structures, marketing
practices, and other concerns.131 Fees are usually taken as a percentage of
assets, and so the higher the fees, the lower the returns and thus are directly
related to performance. Fees are also tied to commissions via trailer revenue,
which impacts advisor behaviour.132 Advisors will often sell to clients the
product that gives them the largest commission payment, whether or not this is in
a client’s best interest.133 If an advisor is paid 60 bps on a ‘‘fund of fund” mutual
fund, but only 50 bps on a standalone fund, there is a disincentive to provide
advice on that standalone fund, especially if it is an RI fund.134 Advisors will sell
what is easy to sell, not necessarily what is in the client’s long-term best interests.
126 FINRA, Rule 2210 — Advertising Regulation (January 9, 2017).
127 Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton et al., ‘‘Succeeding in the New Paradigm for Corporate
Governance”, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation (2018), online:<https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/23/engagement-
succeeding-in-the-new-paradigm-for-corporate-governance/>.
128 AustraliaCorporations Act, supra note 87 at part 7.9; ASIC,RG 168Disclosure: Product
Disclosure Statements (and other disclosure obligations) (October 28, 2011).
129 Ibid. at RG 168.4.
130 Ibid. at RG 168.38.
131 Mutual Fund Sales Practices, OSC NI 81-105 (2013) 36 OSCB (Supp-3).
132 Investment Fund Continuous Disclosure, OSCNI 81-106 (2018), 41 OSCB #40 (Supp-2),
ss. 15.1, 17.1; see also Weinstein, supra note 80 at 16, 26, 28.
133 Weinstein, supra note 80 at 47, 75, 79.
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The CSA is currently investigating the need to amend fee arrangement
structures.135 A recent CSA study found that funds that pay commission
underperform other funds, with distribution costs raising expenses and lowering
investment returns.136 The study found advisors push investors into riskier funds,
with compensation influencing the flow of money.137 Larger embedded
commissions stimulate sales, with recommendations being sometimes biased in
favour of products that generate more commission for the advisor.138 The
evidence is clear: fee structures impact advice and product recommendations.
Commission is only one form of inducement that influences sales. Other
inducements (advancement, recognition, etc.) can also influence sales.139
Compensation affects the effort made by advisors to overcome investor
behavioural biases, including biases that may lead to sub-optimal returns. It is
not yet known if banning commission-based products in favour of asset or fee-
based structures will result in a net improvement in the overall return to the
investor.140 Selling investments based on an improper match between risk
propensity and the risk of the investment will not be eradicated by a change of
compensation regime, but it will likely be diminished.141 In jurisdictions that
have moved to fee-based compensation, people with less wealth and less income
find it harder to get advisory service than others.142
Like the CSA, FINRA has noted that the fee structure of certain products
incents advisors to increase their sales.143 Advisors employed by firms with
proprietary funds tend to sell a higher proportion of their most profitable fund
classes. Captive advisors are more likely to recommend in-house products.144
Underlying licensure shapes the focus of advice.145 Commission-only advisors
sell individual equities in greater numbers and asset sizes than others, while ETFs
are sold more by fee-only advisors.146 Similar to the Canadian experience, there
134 The author experienced this reality as an investment advisor for one of the large financial
institutions.
135 Review of Practices Firms Use to Compensate and Provide Incentives to their
Representatives, OSC CSA Staff Notice 33-318 (2016) 39 OSCB 10115; CSADiscussion
Paper and Request for Comment 81-407,Mutual Fund Fees (2012) 35 OSCB 11233.
136 Weinstein, supra note 80 at 15.
137 Ibid. at 25.
138 Ibid. at 17.
139 Ibid. at 26.
140 Ibid. at 6.
141 Ibid. at 7.
142 Consultation on the Option of Discontinuing Embedded Commissions, CSA Consultation
Paper 81-408 (January 10, 2017) at 76; IFIC, IFICSubmissionRe:ConsultationPaper 81-
408 (June 9, 2017) at 4.
143 FINRA, ‘‘Report on Examination Findings” (December 6, 2017), online: <http://
www.finra.org/industry/2017-report-exam-findings/product-suitability> at 6.
144 Weinstein, supra note 80 at 35.
145 Ibid. at 34.
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is an inherent potential conflict of interest for suitability of investments due to
compensation structures. This has repercussions for the entire industry but could
have profound implications for RI products.
Fee structures have been studied in Australia.147 Unlike Canada and the US,
Australia has made the proactive choice to regulate commission structures. These
regulations could curtail the potentially conflicting methods advisors use to
artificially inflate their commission payments. Unfortunately, a recent
amendment rolls back many of these amendments.148 The ban on embedded
commissions remains.149
(vi) Education
While commission and compensation are issues with all mutual fund
products, not just RI, a more serious concern prejudicing RI uptake is the lack of
knowledge of the advisor on RI. The educational requirements to be licensed
under MFDA are simple and straightforward. There is only one required course,
the Investment Funds of Canada (IFIC) course and exam.150 There are no
current educational requirements dealing with either ESG or RI issues. It is
difficult to understand how MFDA representatives can accurately and materially
recommend (or not recommend) RI investments if they have no education or
knowledge on the subject.151 Like MFDA advisor education, the importance of
advisor education on IIROC advisors cannot be understated. The Canadian
Securities Course (CSC) is currently the mandatory course to become an IIROC
licensed advisor.152 Like the mutual funds’ exam, the CSC does not have an RI/
ESG education component. It is thus doubtful that many IIROC advisors have
the knowledge to understand and recommend RI products.
A broker-dealer agent (‘‘Agent”) in the US must complete the Series 7,153
Series 63,154 Series 66155 and the new Securities Industry Essentials156 (SIE)
146 Ibid. at 38.
147 Australia,Corporations Amendment, (Future of Financial Advice Act) 2012, No 67, 2012
and Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012,
No 68, 2012.
148 Corporations Amendment (Financial Advice Measures) (Australia) Bill, 2016, No. 22,
2016.
149 Herbert Smith, ‘‘ASIC’s new ‘fees for service’ model: impact on takeovers and schemes”,
Lexology, online: <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=828ba0b4-09ea-
4715-bc27-c65a8862048f>.
150 IFIC, ‘‘IFIC exam” (Course list, 2017), online: <https://www.ifse.ca/courselist/
canadian-investment-funds-course-cifc/>; Canadian Securities Institute offers Invest-
ment Funds in Canada (Course, CSI, 2017), online: <https://www.csi.ca/student/en_ca/
courses/csi/ifc_info.xhtml>.
151 The certified financial planner is a designation only.
152 CSI, ‘‘Canadian Securities Course” (Course, CSI, 2018), online: <https://www.csi.ca/
student/en_ca/courses/csi/csc.xhtml>.
153 FINRA, Series 7 Exam - General Securities Representative Exam (GS) [Series 7].
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exams. The Agent must then register with the Central Registration Depository
maintained by FINRA.157 A candidate who passes the Series 7 exam is qualified
for the solicitation, purchase and/or sale of all securities products, including
corporate securities, municipal fund securities, options, direct participation
programs, investment company products and variable contracts.158 Thus, this
includes stocks, bonds, mutual funds, ETFs. Series 7 is an equivalent to the CSC,
and licensing would be similar to that of IIROC.159 Series 65160 are necessary to
become a full independent Investment Advisor. Series 6 exams, on the other
hand, are similar to MFDA requirements, in that the Series 6 exam assesses the
competency of entry-level representatives to perform their job as investment
company and variable contracts products representatives.161 There is no mention
of ESG criteria in either the Series 6 or Series 7 exams, or in the SIE.
ASIC has set the minimum training standards for all financial product
advisors, not just investment advisors.162 The type of training depends upon
which products are advised.163 However, qualifications in Australia are much
more robust and onerous. Australian financial advisors must have a relevant
bachelor or higher degree, or equivalent qualification.164 These qualifications,
plus the suitability requirements noted above, make if much more likely that
advisors will have some familiarity with RI products.
154 FINRA, Series 63 - Uniform Securities Agent State Law Examination (Course, FINRA,
2018).
155 FINRA, Series 66 — Uniform Combined State Law Examination (Course, FINRA,
2018), online: <http://www.finra.org/industry/series66>.
156 As of October 1, 2018, FINRA Rule 1210.03 was updated to the new Series 7 and the
Securities Industry Essential Exam, see ‘‘Securities Industry Essentials Exam”, online:
<http://www.finra.org/industry/essentials-exam>. There is still no ESG requirements
for either exam. FINRA, ‘‘Securities Industry Essential Examination — Content
Outline”, online: <http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/SIE_Content_Outli-
ne.pdf>; FINRA, EC Approves Consolidated FINRA Registration Rules, Restructured
Representative-Level Qualification Examinations and Changes to Continuing Education
Requirements, Regulatory Notice 17-30 (October 2017).
157 E.g. New Hampshire Securities Act, Ch. 421-B Uniform Securities Act, at (B)9.
158 Series 7, supra note 153.
159 Financial PlannerWorld, ‘‘Becoming aFinancialAdvisor in Canada”, online:<https://
www.financialplannerworld.com/canadian-advisor/>.
160 FINRA, ‘‘Series 65 -Uniform InvestmentAdviser LawExamination” (Course, FINRA,
2018), online: <http://www.finra.org/industry/series65>.
161 FINRA, ‘‘Series 6 Investment Company and Variable Contracts Products Representa-
tive Exam (IR)”, online: <http://www.finra.org/industry/series6>. (Also amended
October 1, 2018 per FINRA Rule 1210.03).
162 ASIC,Regulatory Guide 46, Licensing: Training of financial product advisers (July 2012).
163 Ibid. at RG 146.7.
164 ASIC, ‘‘Professional standards for financial advisers”, online: <https://asic.gov.au/
regulatory-resources/financial-services/professional-standards-for-financial-advisers-
reforms/>.
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(b) Summary Conclusions
Current advisor licensing requirements create significant limitations for RI
investment uptake. Mutual fund advisors should be able to provide advice on
ETFs, bonds or CEDIFs, structures that as shown in the next section are more
likely to be RI. Weinstein found that in the US, there are three other reasons for
lower ETF sales:
1. Many financial advisors are not allowed to sell ETFs.
2. Some clients and advisors view ‘‘stock-picking” as the focus of their
relationship.
3. Advisors may not be willing to expend the time and effort to get clients
comfortable with a new product.165
Advisors, in both Canada and the US, have commission and compensation
structures that favour some products over others which may limit promotion of
RI funds. Fee structures that bias advice towards a current product or class of
products should be banned. Poor investment decisions by investors around type
and style of investment products appear to be the result of a ‘‘lack of financial
awareness and education, better advertising of active-styled products, and more
enthusiastic promotion of actively managed funds by intermediaries perhaps due
to sales commissions, and overconfidence biases of investors and advisors and
fund managers.”166 Fee structures need to be updated to ensure that RI funds are
promoted as enthusiastically as higher commission paying funds.
Current KYC obligations do not mandate any RI-type questions, and it is
highly recommended that suitability requirements be updated to incorporate
ESG issues. Updating KYC requirements without updating education
requirements would be ill advised, as advisors would not be able to provide
the advice to satisfy their duty of care. Currently advisors do not have the
training or education required for RI promotion. Mandating ESG factors as part
of both a mutual fund and an investment advisor’s education requirements
would aid in RI uptake: ‘‘Overcoming these issues requires a mixture of
regulation, education, overcoming misconceptions about ESG integration and
toolkits for investment practice.”167
Thus, all areas of advice in Canada contribute to a lack of RI uptake. It is
inconceivable that an advisor can recommend the proper products for their
clients without understanding either the client or the product.168 US advisors,
165 Weinstein, supra note 80 at 38.
166 Bollen, supra note 22 at 234.
167 UNEP FI, Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century — Canada Roadmap (New York: UNEP
FI, 2017) at 5.
168 FINRA, Rule 2111; Lawrence Ritcie, Louis Tsilivis & Marleigh Dick, ‘‘CSA publishes
harmonized response to concerns regarding client-registrant relationship”, Osler LLP
(June 22, 2018) online:<https://www.osler.com/en/blogs/risk/june-2018/csa-publishes-
harmonized-response-to-concerns-regarding-client-registrant-relationship.>
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like their Canadian counterparts, may conflict due to compensation structures,
and also like Canadian advisors, do not have the training required to provide
advice on RI.
Australia has moved to a best interest standard, unlike Canada, and has
already mandated fee structure changes to limit compensation conflicts. This best
interest standard specifically includes mandates to ask clients about their
environmental, social and ethical interests. Canada should implement Australia’s
enhanced duty of care standards, KYC ESG questions, and limits on fee
compensation. This best interest standard would elevate the obligations of all
advisors while still not becoming a fiduciary standard.169 The June 2018 proposal
would put the client’s interest first when making a suitability determination.170
Unfortunately, the CSA is backtracking on its reforms and RI, which could have
been an unintended beneficiary, is an unintended casualty.171
3. ANALYSIS
The Mass Affluent, generally speaking, can only access MFDA advisors.
IIROC advisors focus on high net worth and accredited investors, mainly due to
fee and commission structures.172 Mutual funds may not be the best vehicles to
construct RI portfolios; however, they have been the default product for the
Mass Affluent. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of RI mutual funds available to
most Canadians.173 There is especially a lack of accessibility to RI for clients of
big banks, as only two banks offer funds with RI mandates.174 Bank sales
representatives must, generally, exclusively sell proprietary products from their
FI and thus clients will not be able to access RI funds. Many independent
169 Michelle Schriever, ‘‘Best Interest Standard Could be Fiduciary Duty in Disguise:
Expert”, Advisor.ca (October 3, 2016), online:<http://www.advisor.ca/news/industry-
news/best-interest-standard-could-be-fiduciary-duty-in-disguise-expert-212984>; Da-
vid Hodges, ‘‘Provincial Regulators Raise concerns about best interest standard for
advisers”, Canadian Press (May 11, 2017).
170 CSA, ‘‘Canadian securities regulators align to publish harmonized response to concerns
with the client-registrant relationship” (June 21, 2018), online:<https://mailchi.mp/osc/
canadian-securities-regulators-publish-harmonized-response-to-concerns-with-the-cli-
ent-registrant-relationship?e=dcff75c17d>.
171 Proposed Amendments to National Instrument 31-103 Registration Requirements,
Exemptions and Ongoing Registrant Obligations, CSA Notice (2018), 41 OSCB (Supp-
1); Barbara Schecter, ‘‘OSC drops push for ‘best interest’ standard as regulators propose
narrower reforms”, Financial Post (June 21, 2018), online: <https://business.financial-
post.com/news/fp-street/osc-drops-push-for-best-interest-standard-as-regulators-pro-
pose-narrower-reforms>.
172 Weinstein, supra note 80 at 74.
173 RIA, Responsible Investment Funds in Canada (December 31, 2017) (Toronto: RIA,
2018); State Street Advisors, ‘‘SPDR SSGA Gender Diversity Index ETF” online:
<https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/SHE:US>;BMO, ‘‘Invest with Impact, Invest in
Women”, Release (February 16, 2017).
174 Ibid.
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investment managers, insurance companies, and credit unions, also do not offer
RI funds.175 In other words, no firm provides access an RI investor would
expect, and most funds are derivative offerings, with high fees.176 US funds offer
the potential to be more diversified than Canadian funds, given the larger
number of companies based in the US, and it should be theoretically ‘‘easier” to
construct a US equity fund that complies with the tenets of RI.177 However,
several of these funds have large minimum investments, so these were would
cater to the accredited investor. Like Canada, none of the major US financial
institutions (Wells Fargo178 or JP Morgan Chase) or the large investment firms
(such as Fidelity) create RI mutual fund products.179 Wells Fargo Private Bank
offers custom RI solutions, but only to accredited investors.180 There are a few
funds that specialize in water issues181 or in women’s rights182 but, like in
Canadian context, they are small niche funds. Thus, mutual funds do not
currently offer true RI selection.
Licensing restrictions limit the availability of ETFs, as ETFs require similar
prospectus disclosure as public companies.183 Yet, there is much greater selection
of RI ETFs, with ETFs constructed for environmentally responsible
technologies, such as water, alternative energy, or green technology.184 Global
175 Investors Group, ‘‘Socially Responsible Investing”, online: <https://www.investors-
group.com/en/investments/products/socially-responsible-investing-sri;> Manulife,
‘‘Responsible Investment”, online: <http://www.manulifeam.com/ca/About-Us/Re-
sponsible-Investment-at-Manulife-Asset-Management/>; Desjardins, ‘‘Responsible
Investment”, online: <https://www.desjardins.com/ca/personal/wealth-management/
our-solutions/responsible-investement/index.jsp>; IA Clarington, IA Clarington In-
hance Canadian Equity SRI Class (March 31, 2018); Desjardins, ‘‘Desjardins SocieTerra
Cleantech Fund, Fund Facts”, online: <https://www.fondsdesjardins.com/informa-
tion/00168_adf_a_en.pdf>; NEI, NEI Canadian Equity RS Fund, Fund Facts (July 12,
2018).
176 Hawken, supra note 30.
177 SIF, ‘‘Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Mutual Fund and ETF Chart”, online:
<https://charts.ussif.org/mfpc/> [SIF].
178 Wells Fargo, ‘‘Mutual Fund Screener”, online:
<https://mutualfunds.wellsfargo.com/mutual-fund-center/mfScreener.aspx?#:L=N-
T:AF=T:SO=T:MRC=0:p=1:c=NM:d=up>.
179 SIF, supra note 177.
180 Wells Fargo, ‘‘Social Impact Investing”, online: <https://www.wellsfargo.com/the-
private-bank/solutions/social-impact-investing/>.
181 Calvert Research, ‘‘Calvert Water Fund”, online: <https://www.calvert.com/Calvert-
Global-Water-Fund-CFWAX.php>.
182 Impax Asset Management, ‘‘Pax Ellevate Global Women’s Leadership Fund”, online:
<https://paxworld.com/pax-ellevate/>.
183 OSA, supra note 32, s. 1.1; Amendments to National Instrument 81-101 Mutual Fund
Prospectus Disclosure, OSC NI 81-101 (2017) 40 OSCB 1584.
184 Investopedia, ‘‘Going Green with Exchange Traded Funds”, online: <http://www.in-
vestopedia.com/articles/exchangetradedfunds/11/going-green-with-etfs.asp#ixz-
z4Eu5X0yXO>;Blackrock Inc., ‘‘iShares Sustainable ETFs Investing for a Sustainable
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water demand is increasing with the SDGs mandating access to water and
sanitation.185 There are no Canadian mutual funds that invest in water or water
infrastructure but there is one Canadian ETF and two US ETFs that focus on
water.186 There are ETFs that focus on low carbon technologies,187 clean
technologies,188 infrastructure,189 battery technologies,190 electric vehicles,191 and
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).192 This contrasts with the mutual fund
industry, which, save for one fund, offers no such opportunities. In short, ETFs
offer a potential solution to the construction of RI.
Mass Affluent investors can only use bond mutual funds as part of their fixed
income.193 High net worth clients can access individual bonds. Green bonds offer
the greatest opportunity for RI; however, they are generally not available to the
Mass Affluent. In Canada, individual bonds are only available via an IIROC
advisor. The 2017 TD green bond was available only through the TD Wealth
Management IIROC network.194 Ontario green bonds were issued via
Future”, online: <https://www.ishares.com/us/strategies/sustainable-investing/sus-
tainable-etfs-product-overview>; iShares, ‘‘Jantzi Social Index ETF”, online:
<https://www.blackrock.com/ca/individual/en/products/239574/ishares-jantzi-social-
index-etf>.
185 UnitedNations,TransformingOurWorld: The 2030Agenda for sustainable development.
Draft resolution referred to the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015
development agenda, UN General Assembly, 2015, 69th session. UN Doc. A/70/L.1 of
(September 18, 2015), SDG7;UNESCO,TheUnited NationsWorldWater Development
Report 2015 Water for a Sustainable World (France: UN, 2015); Lady Justice Arden,
‘‘Water for all? Developing a Human Right to Water in National and International
Law” (2016) 65 Int Comparative L Quar 771 at 787.
186 Blackrock Inc., ‘‘iShares Global Water Index ETF, Fund Facts”, online: <https://
www.blackrock.com/ca/individual/en/products/239755/ishares-sp-global-water-index-
fund>; Invesco, ‘‘Invesco S&P Global Water Index ETF”, online: <http://etfdb.com/
etf/CGW/>.
187 iShares, ‘‘MSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF (CRBN), Fund Facts”, online:
<https://www.ishares.com/us/products/271054/ishares-msci-acwi-low-carbon-target-
etf>; SPDRMSCI ACWI Low Carbon Target ETF (LOWC).
188 Invesco, ‘‘Invesco Cleantech EFF, Fund Facts”, online: <https://www.invesco.com/
portal/site/us/investors/etfs/product-detail?productId=PZD>.
189 First Trust Advisors LP, ‘‘First Trust NASDAQClean Edge Smart Grid Infrastructure
Index Fund” (GRID), online: <https://www.ftportfolios.com/retail/etf/etfsummar-
y.aspx?Ticker=GRID>; NASDAQ OMX, ‘‘Clean edge Smart Grid Infrastructure”,
online: <https://cleanedge.com/indexes/stock-index/qgrd>.
190 Global X Funds, ‘‘Lithium & Battery Tech ETF”, online: <https://www.globalx-
funds.com/funds/lit/>.
191 Global X Funds, ‘‘Autonomous & Electric Vehicles ETF”, online: <https://www.glo-
balxfunds.com/funds/driv/>.
192 iShares MSCI Global Impact ETF (MPCT).
193 Green bond funds do not yet exist in Canada. US, Calvert Investments, ‘‘Calvert Green
Bond Fund (A)”, online: <https://www.calvert.com/Calvert-Green-Bond-Fund-
CGAFX.php>.
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prospectus, so only IIROC advisors have access.195 Government documents state
that the province may examine opportunities to sell Green Bonds directly to
retail investors, but only if it is cost effective and after the domestic market has
matured.196 Both bonds were oversubscribed, so it was a missed opportunity to
allow retail investors the ability to purchase this vehicle, stimulating interest in
green bonds. It is this questionable line of thinking that prevents RI uptake from
hitting the mainstream.
US and international investors have similar problems as Canadian retail
investors. Many issuers in the US fear a green bond issuance due to potential
litigation due to claims of misrepresentation, leaving large organizations to issue
green bonds to which mass affluent investors cannot access.197 Access in
Australia to green bonds is also very limited. National Australia Bank launched
Australia’s first green mortgage bond in 2018.198 It had pricing similar to a non-
green bond, (i.e. no greenium), yet the bond was oversubscribed.199 The largest
investor has been asset managers and individual investors cannot purchase these
bonds.200 The World Bank has issued green bonds but investors in these bonds
are almost solely institutional investors,201 with few issuances available to
194 TD Bank, ‘‘TD Bank Green Bond DNV GL Eligibility Assessment”, online: <https://
www.td.com/document/PDF/Verification_Statement.pdf>.
195 Ontario, ‘‘Green Bonds”, online: <http://www.ofina.on.ca/greenbonds/>; Sean Kid-
ney, ‘‘Ontario issues long-awaited inaugural green bond”, CBI (October 6, 2014), online:
<https://www.climatebonds.net/2014/10/ontario-issues-long-awaited-inaugural-
green-bond-cad-500m-4481m-175-4yrs-aa2e-mixed>.
196 Ontario, ‘‘Ontario Green Bond Q&A’s” (January 26, 2017), online: <http://www.o-
fina.on.ca/greenbonds/>.
197 Kate Allen, ‘‘Strict US market rules limit corporate sellers of green bonds”, Financial
Times (February 20, 2018), online: <https://www.ft.com/content/baa217c4-157c-11e8-
9376-4a6390addb44>;Cicero, ‘SecondOpinion’ on FannieMaeMultifamily Green Bond
Framework (June 8, 2018); Alicia Jones, ‘‘Fannie Mae Wins Recognition as Largest
Issuer of Green Bond by the Climate Bonds Initiative”, Press Release (March 20, 2018);
BoA, ‘‘Bank of America Issues Its Third and Largest Green Bond”, Press Release
(November 10, 2016).
198 NAB, NAB Climate Bonds, online: <https://capital.nab.com.au/information/green-
and-sri-bonds>.
199 Paulina Duran, ‘‘Australia green bond market muzzled by policy uncertainty”, Reuters
(February 5, 2018), online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-bonds-
green/australia-green-bond-market-muzzled-by-policy-uncertainty-idUSKBN1F-
P0OS>.
200 ColeLatimer, ‘‘Climate bondsmarket tohit a newbenchmark in 2018”, SydneyMorning
Herald (January 10, 2018), online: <https://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-
finance/2018-the-year-of-the-green-bond-20180109-p4yycb.html>; Oliver Yates,
‘‘Australia’s budding green bond market”, Clean Energy Finance Corp. (June 2015),
online: <https://www.cefc.com.au/media/feature-articles/files/australias-budding-
green-bond-market/>.
201 World Bank,GreenBond Impact Report (Washington,DC:World BankTreasury, 2017)
at 7;World Bank, ‘‘GreenBondsAttract Private Sector Climate Finance”, PressRelease
(June 10, 2015), online: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/
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Accredited Investors.202 There are no World Bank green bonds for the Mass
Affluent. In sum, the ability of any Mass Affluent retail investor to procure a
green bond is extremely limited. A green bond ETF is the only current method to
invest in these vehicles.203
Institutional investors have an advantage as they are able to purchase
investments inaccessible to the retail investor.204 The Greening Canada Fund
(GCF) invested directly in carbon credits and is an example of an alternative
model mandated to combat climate change.205 The advantages/disadvantages of
offsets are outside the scope of the article.206 The GCF followed a private equity
model, rather than a mutual fund structure.207 The offering was by a private
placement and was unavailable to the public.208 Ironically, despite the lack of a
prospectus, investors had more information available to them prior to purchase
than an investor would normally have.209 Securities law thus may have it wrong.
It is not the complexity or structure of the product that should warrant public
green-bonds-climate-finance>; World Bank, ‘‘Green Bonds”, online: <http://treasur-
y.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/treasury/ibrd/ibrd-green-bonds>.
202 World Bank, World Bank Launches First Kangaroo Green Bond, Press Release (April
16, 2014); World Bank, ‘‘World Bank Green Bonds for Merrill Lynch Wealth




203 S&P Dow Jones, ‘‘A Look Inside Green Bonds: Combining Sustainability With Core
Fixed Income” (May 2018), online:<https://ca.spindices.com/indices/fixed-income/sp-
green-bond-index>; iShares, ‘‘ESG USD Corporate Bond ETF”, online: <http://
etfdb.com/etf/SUSC/>.
204 S. Kaplan & A Schoar, ‘‘Private equity performance: returns, persistence, and capital
flows” (2005) 60 J Finance 1791, Keith Black, ‘‘Defining Liquid Alternative
Investments” (2015) 17:3 J Alternative Investments 6 at 8; UN PRI, Integrating ESG
in Private Equity: A Guide for General Partners (New York, PRI, 2014); Patricia Crifo,
Vanina Forget & Sabrina Teyssier, ‘‘The price of environmental, social and governance
practice disclosure:An experimentwithprofessional private equity investors” (2015) 30 J
Corporate Finance 168 at 169.
205 Greening Canada Fund LP., Amended and Restated Limited Partnership Agreement
(September 30, 2009), S. 3.1.
206 Kathy Dhanda & Laura Hartman, ‘‘The Ethics of Carbon Neutrality: A Critical
Examination of Voluntary Carbon Offset Providers” (2011) 100 J Business Ethics 119;
Shi-Ling Hsu, ‘‘International Market Mechanisms” in The Oxford Handbook of
International Climate Change Law, Cinnamon Carlarne, Kevin Gray, and Richard
Tarasofsky (eds) (Oxford University Press, 2016) at 249; Brianne Riehl et al., “Lessons
Learned in Mandatory Carbon Market Development” (2017) 10:3-4 Int Rev Env and
Resource Economics 227.
207 Greening Canada Fund LP, Limited Partnership Interests, Confidential Offering
Memorandum (September 17, 2009).
208 Ibid.
209 Marcelo Labbe & Colin Atkinson, ‘‘On the pricing of Emission Reduction Purchase
Agreement contracts” (2010) 3:2 J Energy Markets 69.
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access; rather it is the amount of information that could allow investors to make
informed decisions. Had a prospectus offering been made, the fund could have
been made available to IIROC-based retail investors. Structured as a mutual
fund, the fund could have been marketed to the Mass Affluent.
Given their local focus, CEDIFs should be a valuable tool to use for RI and
could be structured to provide tangible ESG benefits, but accessibility by most
Mass Affluent investors is precluded.210 A purchaser must use an IIROC
advisor, yet not all IIROC advisors can access this vehicle.211 A mutual fund of
several CEDIF entities should be created to offer diversification to reduce the
inherent risks in a CEDIF.212 Jurisdictions could use this as a true model of a
unique legal structure to ‘‘incent” investors to incorporate using this structure.
(a) Summary Conclusions
ETFs show more evidence of ‘‘RI-ness” as there are ETFs that invest in low
carbon, alternative energy, water, solar, and cleantech. ETFs are not riskier than
funds and precluding investors from accessing vehicles due to structure rather on
complexity fails to protect investors from risk. There does not seem to be a solid
justification for preventing greater access to these products. Green bonds also
hold great promise but are not made readily available to the Mass Affluent. They
are not structurally different from other bonds, so there is no justification for
why they are not part of a fixed income mutual fund. To access ETFs, bonds,
and CEDIFs only two options currently exist. The first is to go to an IIROC
licensed investment advisor, but as noted, most of these advisors have large
minimum investment assets making this not an option for the Mass Affluent.
The second option is to use an online brokerage account, but most clients do not
have the time, energy or ability to undertake ‘‘do it yourself” investing. Most
Mass Affluent investors need the services of an advisor. The unfortunate reality
is that there is an inherent lack of accessibility for the Mass Affluent. At the retail
level, access, not theory is what is needed. MFDA and Series 6 licensed
representatives need to be allowed to sell a wider array of products, including
ETFs and green bonds.
New regulations around the licensing of MFDA advisors are required. New
structures of fixed income investments that are available to the Mass Affluent are
required. FIs must eliminate propriety offerings, or at the very least, allow their
advisors access to the universe of investments within their licensing.
210 Cedif.ca, ‘‘Community Economic Development Investment Funds”, online: <http://
cedif.ca/funds/bca-investment-co-operative-limited/>.
211 CEDIF Regs, supra note 58, s. 3(4) CEDIF Application Process FAQs, para. 12,
Community Economic Development Investment Funds, NSSC CP 45-601 (January 17,
2014) ss. 1.2, 3(4) Wind4all Communities III Inc., Offering Memorandum (January 14,
2016) at 29.
212 Ibid. at 13.
414 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [34 B.F.L.R.]
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559871
4. CONCLUSION
Securities laws are designed to ‘‘protect” Mass Affluent investors against loss
due to complex structures, creating a system whereby most investors do not have
access to all investment vehicles. Retail investors need RI products. MFDA
advisors should be able to access all types of mutual funds, granting access to
specialized products and certain CEDIFs. A better method of ‘‘mainstreaming”
RI is required. This article is not advocating for all products be available to all
advisors, as any specific investment must be reviewed to determine suitability,
and this article is not advocating for its use as a valid or ‘‘good” investment
option. Rather, regulators must look at broadening the options available for RI
investments.
Secondly, standards for retail advisors must improve. Implementing a best
interest standard, along with enhanced pay structures and education
requirements on RI is necessary. More informed advisors with knowledge of
potential RI options would encourage investment. Aligning pay and commission
structures would help RI uptake and it would stop the disincentive of promoting
products that pay the advisor better, rather than the client preference.
Timing could not be better for change, as there are many other issues that
securities regulators are dealing with for mutual funds and advisors. However,
CSA backtracking makes this unlikely, which is cause of concern for RI going
forward.
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